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ABstrAct
Poland’s transition from an authoritarian communist regime to a liberal democ-
racy and market economy and from an army controlled by the country’s only 
party, the Communist Party, to actual civilian control started at the end of 1989, 
in particular after Lech Walęsa was elected president. Unlike many other post-
communist states, especially Germany, Poland regards the army as an institution 
that is the nation’s school, the bearer of national unity and the guarantee of the 
state’s existence. The Armia Ludowa – people’s army – of communist Poland took 
over many national traditions of the Polish army, combined them with Marxist 
and pro-Soviet ideology, and stayed out of political games despite being con-
trolled by the political main directorate of the party. Both the party and the army 
derived their legitimacy from the people. After the declaration of martial law in 
1981, the army unexpectedly found itself with all the power and this was a seri-
ous blow to the prestige of the army in the eyes of the people.
The changes made at the beginning of the 1990s were small at first: mem-
bers of the high command of the army were released from duty or resigned, but 
younger officers, many of them former members of the party, stayed on. The 
patron saints of the units and pre-war traditions were restored and field ordi-
nariates of the three biggest churches were established, although there were 
Catholic chaplains in the Polish army also before 1989. Two crises were impor-
tant from the viewpoint of civilian control: the first of them was related to the 
attempt by the conservative Defence Minister Jan Parys to cleanse the ranks 
of officers and the other to the public non-confidence motion against Defence 
 Minister Piotr Kołodziejczyki by the Chief of the General Staff. The position of 
the Chief of the General Staff (i.e. the army) in relation to the Defence Minister, 
the parliament and the President was regulated thereafter. The military intel-
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ligence created after World War II similar to the Soviet Army was reorganised 
as late as 2006.
The transition to democratic civilian control was driven more by the desire 
of Polish politicians and generals to join NATO than internal developments in 
Polish politics and the army. In Poland, the army is regarded as a national institu-
tion that has certain immunity. The example of Poland shows that the post-com-
munist transition of the army to democratic civilian control is in many respects 
comparable to the post-fascist transition of the armies in Germany, Italy, Spain 
or Portugal.
The integration of a significant number of former Warsaw Pact member 
states, including Poland, into NATO was one of the most visible manifes-
tations of the fundamental turnaround from “East” to “West” undertaken 
by those countries after 1989–90. Next to extensive material, technologi-
cal and organisational changes, this metamorphosis implied a fundamen-
tal politico–normative reorientation from communism to democracy.
In the light of the established perception of democratic opposition 
movements in those countries having “defeated” the respective commu-
nist regime (after a longer or shorter period of “resistance”), it would seem 
that those normative changes had essentially already happened before the 
event, fuelled not least by a transnational human rights discourse in the 
wake of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 
process.1 Beyond any doubt, this was a crucial element of preparing 
regime change; but one rather pervasive problem with opposition studies 
(on any country) is the question of how representative those “democratic” 
opposition activists2 were for the general public and its political views. 
Moreover, just as important as the transnational context were country-
1 See Sarah B. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War. A Transnational 
History of the Helsinki Network (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), esp. ch. 5, 
115–134; more generally: Entangled Protest: Transnational Perspectives on the History of Dissent 
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed. Robert Brier (Osnabrück: Fibre, 2013).
2 A discussion of the question of which of the anti-communist forces in Poland united until 
1990 under the Solidarity label were actually democratic in a Western liberal sense would 
require a separate paper.
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specific domestic attitudes towards principles of societal organisation and 
the question of to which degree the rulers and the ruled agreed on those 
issues.
In Poland, there is an especially strong idea of a national “spirit of 
freedom” that is embedded in a romantic narrative of the divided nation 
and its pervasive “resistance” during the “long 19th century” that was 
renewed under communist rule. While this is not the place for a general 
critique of this view, at least concerning post-World War II Poland, later 
than 1956 one cannot speak of a particularly repressive regime (notably if 
compared with the Soviet Union or East Germany). Rather, the main tool 
employed by the Polish communist regime to achieve political legitimacy 
and societal cohesion was that very romantic narrative and its nationalist 
implications.
This, along with the fact that within that narrative a military and 
indeed militarist dimension was pivotal, makes it appear reasonable to 
reflect upon the role of the Polish Army within the transition process: 
How did the most important pillar3 of the Polish communist regime react 
to the changing international security situation, and how did it manage 
in 1989–90 to survive regime change and integrate into the new domestic 
and international order?
Introduction: Systemic transition  
as a civil–military process
The transition from communism (or, real socialism) that the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) began in 1989–90, has generally been 
held by scholars to be specific because it comprised a considerable change 
of both the political and the economic structures while most of the com-
parable cases, notably dictatorships in Southern Europe and Latin Amer-
ica, were already part of the West (in the sense of: the capitalist world) 
3 In Poland, the civilian Security Service (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa) wielded little public respect, 
notably because of its complete association with the weak party, and thus was of secondary 
importance for regime stabilisation.
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when their reform process began, which thus was largely confined to the 
political dimension (democratisation).4 Moreover, this complex internal 
process in the CEEC was accompanied, and partially determined, by a 
reorientation/readjustment of external relations. In concrete terms, that 
meant the (gradual) replacement of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON 
(Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) as supportive communities 
by NATO and the European Union, which supervised and influenced the 
process from without. Therefore, not only the principles of the domestic 
political order were to be screened and likely changed but those of the 
foreign and security policies of those countries, as well.
4 See: Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996); Gerardo L. Munck and Carol Skalnik Leff, “Modes of Transition and 
Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective,” Compara-
tive Politics vol 29, no 3, April, Special Issue: Transitions to Democracy (1997): 343–362.
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw (2011). Wikimedia Commons
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According to liberal/idealist theory, there should be little difference 
between those two fields, holding that foreign policy be widely the reflec-
tion of domestic interest representation and decision-making, with every-
body tending towards a more and more peaceful and cooperative policy 
culture. In contrast, realist theory sees foreign policy, i.e. its actors, rather 
as an autonomous expert group serving the protection of a fairly stable 
national interest that is informed not (in the first place) by the domestic 
policy process but by assumedly permanent values and interests of an 
equally permanent nation/body politic. This topic became relevant in the 
Central European (and other) transition situations.5
Important here is that the “West”, from which the countries in transi-
tion sought advice, has itself never been unanimous as to the validity of 
either of those theories. This has to do with the wide range of systemic 
outlooks within the “West” and equally with different political traditions. 
Similarly, the very term “transition” is problematic regarding its implica-
tion of clearly defined goals, in this case liberal democracy and market 
economy, even if these goals are in reality fairly general and leave consid-
erable leeway for “individual” shaping.
Another theoretical body that concerns the transition process, is the 
teaching on civil–military relations, especially where it deals with the 
specificity of civilian control in communist regimes6 and the necessary 
transition from one-party/authoritarian to democratic (or, “real”) civilian 
control. Although in the CEEC, this aspect was less crucial than in the 
aforementioned “Western” ex-dictatorships where the military had long 
wielded a much larger influence and had their own political agenda,7 it 
was nevertheless important.
There are two further issues that should be considered in this context: 
First, which are the values that worked in domestic politics – before and 
5 See for a neorealist approach: Tom Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-
Cold War Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
6 For a Western account in the late stage of the Cold War see: Amos Perlmutter and William 
M. LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil–Military Relations in Com-
munist Political Systems,” The American Political Science Review vol 76, no 4 (1982): 778–789.
7 Aurel Croissant and David Kühn, Militär und zivile Politik (München: Oldenbourg, 2011), 
195–196.
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after 1989–90 – and thus would, to a larger or smaller degree, impact on 
foreign policy, too, not least in the field of security and defence policy? 
Precisely if the military does obey the civilian leadership, it is crucial to 
know what goals leadership pursues, and how “civilian” these goals actu-
ally are.8 And second, with which historical precedents (whatever way 
interpreted) are those values associated?
Other theories of civil–military relations, too, will be tried to apply 
in this paper: Samuel Huntington’s definition of “subjective” and “objec-
tive” civilian control of the military, and Amos Perlmutter’s concept of the 
“praetorian army”. However, the author would already like to claim here 
that none of these approaches seem to fit the rather sui generis case of 
communist and post-communist Poland in a convincing manner.
The Polish case of systemic transition
Among the countries that shed communist rule between 1989 and 1991, 
Poland represented a specific type that was different from two other 
types: on the one hand, East Germany whose state vanished, along with 
its army NVA, as a result of German reunification on October 3rd, 1990, 
and on the other, the post-Soviet states that either resumed older national 
structures and traditions (such as the Baltic States) or effectively had to 
invent new ones (such as Ukraine). Crucially, Poland, similarly to the 
other states in the former Soviet zone of influence that remained intact in 
regard to their territorial status, did not experience after 1989 any signifi-
cant formal changes to its status under international law, either. Neither 
was the state’s institutional structure fundamentally modified, except for 
communist bodies such as the State Council already disappearing under 
the “mixed” regime in force during the year between July 1989 and July 
1990. This way, in Poland there was a fairly large continuity of formal sov-
ereignty and state institutions dating back to 1944 (or, depending on the 
8 On this issue cf. Karen E. Smith, “Still ‘civilian power EU?’,” London School of Econom-
ics European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 2005/1, http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/
research/projects/cidel/old/ WorkshopOsloSecurity/Smith.pdf (accessed 16.5.2014).
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point of view, even to 1918). Essentially, Poland’s international position 
(e.g. its membership in international organisations such as the UNO and 
the CSCE) remained unaltered, with the main change in foreign relations 
being – as indicated – its reorientation from the obsolete Eastern bloc 
organisations towards the Western ones.
Regarding domestic structures, the main task for the new Solidarity-
based political class that gradually took over in 1989–90, was to free state 
institutions from the overarching control structures of the ruling party 
PZPR (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza – Polish United Workers 
Party) and in turn submit them to democratic control. This was – under-
standably – interpreted as a “return to normalcy”; however, what was not 
reflected there was the fact that even before the era of “alien occupation”, 
which lasted, in a popular view, from 1939 through to 1989 (as Nazi Ger-
man, Soviet, and later Polish communist rule),9 Poland had not been a 
democracy but a semi-dictatorial military regime, and that accordingly 
a simple “return” to pre-communist times might be difficult. In light 
of the theory of civil–military relations, the crucial point to be obeyed 
here – but which was not so well reflected by Polish politics and society 
at any moment after 1944 – is the difference between civilian control in 
general and democratic civilian control in particular. According to the 
mainstream opinion of Western research, only the latter is compatible 
with the way that a Western-style democracy is supposed to relate to its 
armed forces and accounts for the difference between democratic and 
non-democratic “civilian” regimes.10 This is as well the necessary refer-
ence framework for a proper definition of “freedom”, “national commu-
nity” and other terms concerning social organisation.
9 As an intellectually high-ranking and balanced presentation of this (nevertheless question-
able) perspective, see: Andrzej Friszke, Polska. Losy państwa i narodu 1939–1989 (Warszawa: 
Iskry 2003).
10 Douglas Bland, “Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil–Military Relations,” Armed Forces 
and Society, Summer 27, no 4 (2001): 525–540.
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the Army as a pillar of communism and guarantor of national 
existence: regime-independent features of civil–military 
relations in communist Poland
However, the sources of Polish thinking about civil–military relations vis-
ibly were and still are mainly rooted in the era preceding such reflective, 
and often deconstructionist, liberal considerations. They illustrate espe-
cially well the ambiguous issue of regime change in a country whose polit-
ico–spiritual basis is not only the myth of a 50-year “fight for freedom” 
from 1939 to 1989 but also the continued romantic idea of the nation 
as a primordial and invariable entity. A characteristic feature was here 
that the numerous changes of government in the 19th and 20th centu-
ries – comprising both Polish and “foreign” (Russian, German, Austrian) 
regimes – had made Polish political thinking focus on statehood and for-
mal independence as central goals while reducing the normative base of 
any given regime – and thus domestic politics in general – to a matter of 
secondary importance as long as it could prove its “Polishness”. This was 
not an ethnic/racist point of thought, but referred, in the tradition of, e.g. 
Johann Gottfried Herder, to the nation as a historical and cultural col-
lective. This view was obviously irreconcilable with the actual nature of 
the so-called First Republic, the multi-ethnic and multi-denominational 
kingdom ruled de facto by the most influential aristocratic families; but 
by 1914/18, the “modern”, ethnocentric type of nationalism had taken 
hold among a large part of the Polish social elites, especially those with a 
(lower) middle class background.
In any case, this romantic view served to establish a strong national-
ism and, in particular, an explicit veneration of anything military that 
was hard to reconcile with the notion of liberal democracy. For it was the 
various regular and irregular military units that were regarded – at least 
with hindsight – as the decisive forces to maintain by their physical per-
formance and sacrifice the Polish claim to statehood and independence 
during the “long” 19th century: beginning from the Kościuszko uprising 
of 1794 via the Legions in Italy and the Polish troops fighting with Napo-
leon’s Grand Army between 1812 and 1815, the abortive risings of 1830, 
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1848 and 1863 to the border fights against all neighbours between 1918 
and 1921. The complex mix, especially within the early phases of this 
long period, of class and “national” perspective and interests tended to be 
neglected, as well as the fact that the peasant majority of the ethnic Poles 
came only slowly to be taken into account by the elite as fellow-citizens 
with a legitimate claim to political participation.11
As one consequence of this, in independent Poland after 1918 the 
Army has not only enjoyed a vast degree of normative and practical 
autonomy – under every regime, with today’s Third Republic certainly 
going furthest in terms of civilian control – but it actually maintained 
the idea of its being the “school of the nation” and guarantor of national 
existence. During the Second Republic (1918–1939), especially since the 
May Coup of 1926, the Army was even, under its leader Józef Piłsud-
ski, the main authority in the state and its leadership was the de facto 
government,12 which contributed to an ambivalent foreign policy includ-
ing errant assessments of both political goals and the actual power rela-
tions in Europe.
The crushing defeat of that regime in September 1939 and the con-
sequent German–Soviet occupation of Poland escalated the aforemen-
tioned focus on foreign and security policy to a veritable obsession. 
Against this background, the Polish communists who took over power 
in autumn 1944, too, resorted to the Army as a physical and spiritual 
anchor. To be sure, it was their Army that had been created in 1943 on 
Soviet territory and been trained by the Red Army. Not only was this new 
military instrumental in establishing communist rule in the country – 
and notably in the hitherto German territories in the West – but between 
1944 and 1947/5313 it waged a veritable civil war against the remnants of 
the wartime Armia Krajowa (Home Army) that had been commanded 
11 Paul Latawski, “The Polish Armed Forces and Society,” – Soldiers and Societies in Post-Com-
munist Europe. Legitimacy and Change, ed. Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew 
Cottey (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 26–28.
12 Andrew A. Michta, The Soldier-Citizen. The Politics of the Polish Army after Communism 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 25–28.
13 The Home Army officially stopped fighting in 1947, but the last anti-communist resistance 
groups were eliminated only in 1953 by the Polish and Soviet security services.
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by the right-wing government-in-exile in London. At the end of the war, 
most Poles sided with the Armia Krajowa; yet, after its destruction the 
communist armed forces took over from their enemies the bulk of mili-
tary habits and traditions, as a lever to win the hearts and souls of the 
anti-communist majority of the Poles.14 Although at least until 1956 these 
national traditions were combined with Marxist and pro-Soviet ideology, 
they remained in place – if with a partially new, class-based interpreta-
tion – and indeed fulfilled their educational and legitimising role. After 
1956, the national outlook of the Army became almost complete again in 
terms of the pre-war pattern, only notably adapting its militant self-per-
ception as both conquerors and defenders of “Polish soil” to the changed 
geopolitical and transnational situation, i.e. the “historically necessary” 
alliance with the Soviet Union.
In this context, it was anything but an insignificant detail that the 
Communist Army in July 1944 shed from its name the word “People’s” 
(Ludowe) that had indicated its class-related origin and further was called 
simply the Polish Army (like the pre-war army). This was both a signal of 
historical continuity and an offer to the public to accept the new army in 
the name of national unity. The crucial reference was now made to exter-
nal enemies, notably “West German revisionism;”15 the wartime memo-
ries invoked by this slogan, sufficed to discipline the majority of the Poles 
and rally them, at least temporarily and to a minimal degree, behind the 
communist leadership. Not least in this context, the Army appeared – and 
to many Poles appears to this day – as an autonomous, apolitical institu-
tion that protects national independence as the highest public good, and 
thus cannot be tainted by the ill-doings of any regime.
Obviously, the organisational and ideological amalgamation of army 
and party, the period of Sovietisation between 1948 and 1956 as well 
as the close integration of the – since 1952 – “Polish People’s Republic” 
( Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa) into the Soviet external empire led to a 
14 Marcin Zaremba, Im nationalen Gewande. Strategien kommunistischer Herrschaftslegitima-
tion in Polen 1944–1980 (Osnabrück: Fibre 2011), 145–184.
15 A. Kemp-Welch, Poland under Communism. A Cold War History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 180.
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characteristic perception of external and internal security of the social-
ist state as being inseparable, and of internal “enemies” as being equally 
dangerous as external threats.16 However, the semantic interpretation 
of what constituted that enmity was widely conditioned, the latest since 
the  Polish–Soviet standoff in October 1956, by the nationalist narrative 
rather than by the logic of class consciousness.
the Army as political agent in the 1970s and 1980s
In 1970–1971 the Army took part in the bloody quelling of workers’ riots 
in the seaports of Gdańsk, Gdynia and Szczecin, which led to serious 
problems with some soldiers’ loyalty. The recurring problem for the Army 
of squaring the circle between external alliance (and thus regime) solidar-
ity and internal “positive nationalism” had been expressed in an exem-
plary way by Minister of Defence Wojciech Jaruzelski after the aforemen-
tioned clashes. During a meeting with shipyard workers in January 1971, 
he asked whether these would want “to have an army that would install 
or change the government [---] as in Latin America and Africa, to have a 
government of colonels and generals?”17
This statement deserves some reflection in the light of, in particular, 
Amos Perlmutter’s theory of the “praetorian army” that was developed 
primarily on the basis of analyses of civil–military relations in “develop-
ing polities”.18 Provided that one regards the communist regimes of the 
time as such polities, the notion of a “politicised” army with the potential 
to step in for a civilian leadership failing to build legitimacy19 seems fairly 
16 F. Rubin, “The Theory and Concept of National Security in the Warsaw Pact Countries,” 
International Affairs vol 58, no 4, Autumn (1982): 650–651.
17 Quoted from a 1985 Polish underground collection of sources on recent Polish history, in 
Andrew A. Michta, Red Eagle. The Army in Polish Politics, 1944–1988 (Stanford: Hoover Insti-
tution Press, 1990), 69.
18 Amos Perlmutter, “The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army. Toward a Taxonomy of 




useful for explaining Polish politics at the time, especially with a view to 
the 1981 introduction of martial law. There, one might well identify the 
Polish Army as a praetorian army of the “arbitrator type” – a professional 
officer corps with limited own political interest and prepared to hand 
back power to the civilians after a period of stabilisation.20 However, three 
caveats seem to be in place about this approach with a view to the Polish 
case: First, the “praetorian army” has been examined by Perlmutter pri-
marily in its relationship with the civilian leadership but less so with the 
general population. In “communist” Poland, both army and party would 
refer throughout their legitimacy principally not to “abstract” Marxism 
but to the nation, if in an authoritarian manner. Second, those two main 
forces of Polish politics did not clash even in 1981 since the army acted in 
direct support of the dwindling party structures.21 And third, most fun-
damentally, most of the social and political conditions for a praetorian 
army’s takeover as defined by Perlmutter were not in place in People’s 
Poland in the 1970s.
In any case, after the 1970 the Polish military leadership under Jaru-
zelski was visibly eager to avoid any violent development in domestic 
politics that would have burdened it with an undesirable responsibility. 
Accordingly, during the 1970s it sought to stay out of the vicissitudes of 
“politics” and rather focused on technical modernisation and soldiers’, 
especially officers’, professionalisation.22 Unchanged, the military leader-
ship continued to serve as the surest guarantors of Soviet hegemony in 
Poland. Ten years later, during the crisis over Solidarity in 1980–81, the 
Army acquired – rather unexpectedly – a much more active role, indeed, 
a “government of colonels and generals” was established. This happened 
because its special status in the eyes of both party leaders and the general 
public allowed the Army to introduce martial law on the 13th of Decem-
ber 1981 and so to take over the state openly in defence of the commu-
20 Perlmutter, “Praetorian State”, 392.
21 Mark N. Kramer, “Civil–Military Relations in the Warsaw Pact: The East European Compo-
nent,” International Affairs vol 61, no 1, Winter (1984–1985): 45.
22 Jerzy J. Wiatr, The Soldier and the Nation. The Role of the Military in Polish Politics, 1918–
1985 (Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1988), 118–122.
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nist regime – which meant, in the first place, keeping Poland within the 
Warsaw Pact and proving its reliability as long as Soviet support seemed 
to be indispensable. Thus, the regime’s references and appeals to patriotic 
rather than socialist/communist values and interests to justify the tough 
measures against the “counterrevolutionary” activities of Solidarity,23 
were not merely a smoke screen to disguise an actually “communist” 
policy, but at a second glance they did reveal the actual motives of the 
military leadership: To them, “Polish socialism” was a governance model 
necessary to safeguard the “national interest” predating communism, and 
the entire socialist outlook of the country mainly a tool for embedding 
the Soviet alliance into that national interest. Significantly, the point of 
martial law allegedly being a measure preventing an invasion by the other 
Warsaw Pact countries – notably the Soviet Union, the GDR and Czecho-
slovakia – was raised by Jaruzelski only much later; at the time of events, 
they acted in full agreement with their allies.24
In any case, the Army’s reputation hardly suffered from its leader-
ship’s role during martial law because society mainly tended to blame the 
party for the breakdown of relations between the regime and Solidarity.25 
This distinction that was wholly unreal given the amalgamation of army 
and party leadership, showed how deeply the described popular pro-
militarism was rooted. Also, after the formal end of martial law in 1983, 
the Army remained in practical control of the country. When after 1985 
the international situation showed signs of a fundamental challenge to 
the communist regimes (mostly on part of the new Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev), the Polish civil–military leadership began to look actively 
23 Jan Olaszek, “Antysolidarnościowa propaganda władz PRL,” – NSZZ Solidarność 1980/1989, 
Vol. 7: Wokół Solidarności, wyd. Łukasz Kamiński i Grzegorz Waligóra (Warszawa: IPN, 2010), 
178–181; Michta, Red Eagle, 207–208.
24 On the motives for action on the part of the Polish and Soviet leaderships, see the account 
by Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the Polish Crisis of 1980–1981,” – 
The Solidarity Movement and Perspectives on the Last Decade of the Cold War, ed. Lee Trepanier, 
Spasimir Domaradzki and Jaclyn Stanke (Kraków: Krakowskie Towarzystwo Edukacyjne, 
2010), 27–66.
25 See an independent opinion poll on the trustworthiness of institutions of May/June 1981, 
KARTA Archive Warsaw, Sign. AO IV/68.3: Ankiety do niezależnych badań socjologicznych, 
Nr. 1; also Wiatr, Soldier and Nation, 147–148.
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Common exercise of c. 800 NATO specialists on Weapon of Mass Destruction 
for NATO Response Force in Drawsko, Poland (2008). General Staff of the 
Polish Army (SGWP)
for an exit strategy; its leaders were flexible enough to strike a deal with 
Solidarity in 1989 that allowed for the survival of the Army and almost 
complete impunity of its leading members. This development confirmed 
that the question of regime and normative issues mattered little for an 
officer corps whose values were fairly autonomous, even solipsist, focused 
on their own peer group and with little reference to the civilian environ-
ment.26 So, their “patriotism” – with regard to civil–military relations – 
was of a particular, rather flexible nature; at the same time, society con-
tinued to receive its own ideas of “patriotism” largely mediated through 
public display of military power.
26 On such corporative interest representation see: Croissant and Kühn, Militär und zivile Poli-
tik, 196–197.
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change and continuity in Polish military policies after 1989
This was relevant for the fate of the Army after the takeover by a Soli-
darity-led government of the country in August 1989, as a result of the 
Round Table talks of spring that year. Initially, the Ministry of Defence 
and the other “force institutions” (notably the Ministry of the Interior) 
remained under control of the party and thus of the military elite. This 
was first questioned by Lech Wałęsa after his election as State President 
in December 1990, and further when in July 1990 a new all-Solidarity 
cabinet took office. Now, while on one hand communist influence in the 
Army could finally be significantly reduced, on the other, several prob-
lems made themselves felt with respect to the need of putting the Army 
under the control of the new civilian powers. Generally speaking, the 
restructuring of the Polish Army was burdened not only, as in all post-
socialist countries, by such issues as budget constraints, the need to adjust 
training goals and methods, and the definition of national security pri-
orities, but also by the uncertainty about the purpose and attitude of the 
Polish officer corps.
First of all, ironically, the dismantling of party structures in the Army, 
notably of the Main Political Administration (Główny Zarząd Polityczny) 
as a de facto branch of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP, in Polish: 
PZPR), prompted the military establishment to demand “freedom at last” 
from civilian interference. Obviously, they didn’t acknowledge that until 
then they had closely cooperated with those party structures, nor did 
they (want to?) understand the concept of civilian control to be inherent 
to democracy. Rather, they favoured a model of a loyal but independent 
army that stood at an equal level with the government, a partner rather 
than a subordinate institution. One reason for this was certainly that, as 
with so many other things, the communists’ pervasive claim of truth had 
distorted the generally sound principle of civilian control;27 in the Pol-
ish case, however, the reliable pro-military attitude in the civilian public 
worked also. Against this background, the Army leadership were hardly 
27 Michta, Soldier-Citizen, 7–8.
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ready to acknowledge any responsibility for the repeated violent incidents 
with military participation during communism;28 in their own eyes, they 
had always simply done their duty, and this way, continued the argument 
of “historical necessity” and of the primacy of external security. Visibly, 
the generals considered neither the tensions between that principle and 
civic liberties, nor the fact that the regime change should have an impact 
on their relationship towards civilian leadership.
This attitude effectuated, among other things, a remarkable difference 
with the memory culture notably of the German Bundeswehr: The latter 
distances itself in an almost paranoid fashion from both the Wehrmacht 
and the GDR’s National People’s Army, and has had, notabene under civil-
ian government, extreme difficulty in establishing even the most rudimen-
tary presence in society. In contrast, the Polish Army is not only almost 
omnipresent in the public space, but has no problem seeing itself as legal 
and spiritual successor to its namesake from the communist era. On the 
whole, there was relatively large personnel continuity after 1989. It is true 
that during the first years, certain groups of high-ranking officers retired 
either voluntarily or were discharged by the government; this concerned 
between 1989 and 1991, apart from the last “socialist” Defence Minister, 
Florian Siwicki (in office until July 1990), about one-third of the generals 
and many other senior officers.29 Nevertheless, most of the personnel dis-
charges and other reductions after 1989 happened for economic reasons 
and as part of force restructuring;30 in any case, the bulk of younger offi-
cers, including many former party members, remained in their positions.
28 It must be noted, though, that Wojciech Jaruzelski later apologised in public for the role 
of Polish forces in the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968 and for the casualties that had 
occurred under martial law in Poland between 1981 and 1983.
29 Paul Latawski, “Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Post-Communist Poland: the Inter-
play of History, Political Society and Institutional Reform,” – Democratic Control of the Military 
in Post-Communist Europe. Guarding the Guards, ed. Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and 
Anthony Forster (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 23.
30 For an overview of the physical and technical changes in the Polish Army after 1989, see 
Lech Giermakowski and Tadeusz Keson, “The Post-socialist Demobilization of Poland’s Armed 
Forces,” – The Military in Transition. Restructuring and Downsizing the Armed Forces of Eastern 
Europe, BICC Brief/Bonn International Center for Conversion, 25, ed. Andreas Heinemann-
Grüder (Bonn: BICC, 2002), 10–23.
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Another factor favouring continuity is the fact that both the Army 
and society treat the regime changes as mere external events that do not 
affect the “inner core” of the Army. As an effect of this, the otherwise 
heavily displayed anti-communism of the post-Solidarity parties and 
their electorates has hardly affected the military that has after 1989 been 
widely spared criticisms based on normative categories, and is not associ-
ated with any regime but with the nation as an “eternal” institution and 
thus indispensable.
The only part of the Army against to which criticism has occasion-
ally been directed is the military secret services that were created in the 
1940s by Soviet intelligence and in whose leading ranks indeed many 
cases of corruption, illegal weapon trade, etc., have been detected. This 
is due to the post-1989 development of mafia-style structures based on 
the continued connections with post-Soviet military intelligence circles. 
Only in 2006, after years of parliamentary and public debate, the then 
right-wing Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) government had 
the military intelligence service WSI (Wojskowe Służby Informacjyne – 
Military Information Services) disbanded. It was replaced by the new 
SWW (Służba Wywiadu Wojskowego – Military Intelligence Service) and 
SKW (Służba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego – Military Counterintelligence 
Service).31
In their stubborn attitude, the military top brass were further but-
tressed by the fact that the new rulers in 1990 decided to leave the Army 
practically untouched. Understandably, when the Warsaw Pact began 
to crumble in 1990, this seemed to be no good moment for a complete 
makeover of the military; rather, the new rulers opted to keep the Army 
as it was provided, of course, its obedience to the new regime. In different 
words, the new rulers applied a balanced policy “between decommunisa-
tion driven by political necessity and continuity in personnel driven by 
military requirements”.32 But the continuity went beyond mere pragmatic 
31 Artur Gruszczak, “The Polish Intelligence Services,” – Geheimdienste in Europa. Transfor-
mation, Kooperation und Kontrolle, ed. Thomas Jäger and Anna Daun (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag 
für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), 129–131.
32 Latawski, “Democratic Control,” 22.
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reasons to a fundamental normative consensus: The politicians from 
the Solidarity camp who took over the Ministry of Defence in 1991 and 
applied a specific and rather simple way of “de-ideologising” the Army, 
namely by reinstating pre-communist traditions: they redrew the lists of 
eligible name patrons for military units, of “memorable” events in mili-
tary history (especially battles), of military holidays, etc. This meant not 
only the review of the “white spots” especially in the history of Polish–
Soviet relations – a measure that had been prepared long before 1989 
by the oppositional underground – but likewise a fairly carefree invoca-
tion of older eras of Polish military history that were represented almost 
wholly in a positive, uncritical manner. In a speech delivered in May 
1991 to the Heads of Educational Services of the Military Districts, the 
new Vice Minister of National Defence, Bronisław Komorowski (today 
Poland’s State President) defined as one goal of the new policy “to make 
visible [again] the withheld leaves of military glory and of the newest 
 history of Poland”.33 Even in his first order of January 1991, the new 
Minister, Piotr Kołodziejczyk, had vowed to re-connect to the “chain of 
generations that ha[d] been interrupted during the half century in the 
Polish People’s Army that had been consciously cut off from its histori-
cal provenance. [Particularly should be invoked] the Poland of the Piasts 
and Jagiellonians [Poland’s hereditary royal dynasties, J.B.], the First 
Republic, the Napoleonic epoch, the era of national uprisings, the Sec-
ond Republic and the fights for independence in the First and the Second 
World Wars”.34
As a result, practically the entire pre-communist Polish history 
appeared as “clean” and, thus, eligible. The major error, or suppression, 
committed by the new defence politicians, was to suggest that in the com-
munist era the nationalist heritage had been too little invoked. Actually, 
the difference from the preceding era was not too big since the commu-
33 Speech by Vice Minister of National Defence Bronisław Komorowski of May 1991 in Żagań, 
quoted by Jerzy Zalewski, Apolityczność Sił Zbrojnych Drugiej i Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej Pols-
kiej. Teoria i praktyka (Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, 2009), 248.
34 Order no 1 of the Minister of National Defence of 2.1.1991 for the area “Heritage and culti-
vation of the traditions of the Polish Armed Forces,” quoted ibid., 250.
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nists had drawn, with some few politically motivated exceptions – such 
as the memory of interwar military leader Józef Piłsudski due to his 
out spoken anti-Russian/Soviet views – on essentially the same nation-
alist heritage; practically all the new deciders did was remove commu-
nist personalities from the list of name patrons. Altogether, the Polish 
case differed quite remarkably from a pattern that American analysts 
had observed – or so they thought – in all former satellites of the Soviet 
Union, namely that “the anti-communist regimes that came to power 
in many of the East European states after 1989 held antagonistic views 
toward the military because of the militaries’ decades-long close links to 
the communists. In an understandable, if rather one-sided, view, the for-
mer dissidents distrusted the military, due to the fact that the military 
had functioned in the context of the Soviet-dominated alliance structure, 
contained a large number of communist party members, and had par-
ticipated in various domestic crackdowns [of which] in Poland in 1956, 
1970, and 1981 [---]”.35
Indeed, the majority, rather conservative Solidarity politicians, were at 
least as “military friendly” as the communists. Apparently at no moment 
did they consider introducing a less militant and nationalist education 
than the one that had been in place throughout the socialist era; after 
1989, if anything, education got even more nationalist than before. Tell-
ingly, within the opposition, pacifist groups such as Wolność i Pokój 
(Freedom and Peace)36 had played only a marginal role. Obviously, the 
Western perspective on the Polish opposition had been guided by the 
Cold War situation, and thus they had paid little attention to the Central 
European nations’ own mostly non-democratic pre-war heritage. Thus, 
Poland’s “return to the West” at least in part looked quite differently from 
what the Westerners had expected; on the other hand, given the continu-
ity of nationalist compromise in the People’s Republic, the development 
was not really surprising.
35 Thomas S. Szayna, F. Stephen Larabee, East European military reform after the Cold War. 
Implications for the United States (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1995), 9–10.
36 The only relevant publication on this movement is Anna Smołka-Gnauck, Między wolnością 
a pokojem. Zarys historii Ruchu “Wolność i Pokój” (Warszawa: IPN, 2012).
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This general pro-military attitude in Polish society and politics led to 
a renewed – after the decade-long pursuit of “socialist military education” 
in People’s Poland – close cooperation between the Ministries of Defence 
and Higher Education in the field of “patriotic” and “defence-minded” 
education of the youth.37 Likewise, even though since 1988 in Poland 
there had existed the option of civilian instead of military service, this 
was hardly made use of until the suspension of universal service in 2010. 
In particular, students continued to serve in the Army under privileged 
conditions that secured them the status of at least a reserve non-commis-
sioned officer. Even after 2010, the economic crisis has again increased 
many students’ interest in a military career.38
One measure aiming at “re-civilising” the Army was the (re-)estab-
lishment of field ordinariates for the Roman Catholic, Polish Auto-
cephalous Orthodox and Protestant Churches in 1991, 1993 and 1995, 
respectively.39 However, it must be mentioned that before 1989 the Polish 
Army had allowed – as the only Warsaw Pact army – the activity of ca. 
45 Roman Catholic military deans, which is to be seen as another step to 
minimise the distance to civil society.40
The second problem with regard to civilian control of the Army aggra-
vated the first one: For a couple of years after 1990, the President and the 
Parliament struggled over who should execute the civilian control over 
the Army. This paralysed them both; consequently, the Polish General 
Staff could play their own game by exploiting the new civilian rulers’ lack 
of experience. According to Andrew Michta, the Polish generals – and 
likewise, to different degrees, their counterparts in other post-socialist 
37 See, e.g. the agreement DKOW-CB-043/10/08 between the Ministries of National Educa-
tion and of National Defence of 21.10.2008 regarding cooperation “in the field of civic, patri-




38 See the article “Wojskowe szkolenie dla studentów“ (Military training for students) in the 
internet-based journal Polska Zbrojna (Armed Poland) of 2.6.2013, http://www.wykop.pl/
ramka/1540485/wojskowe-szkolenie-dla-studentow (accessed 30.11.2013).
39 Latawski, “Polish Armed Forces and Society,” 33.
40 Zalewski, Apolityczność, 248, footnote 152.
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countries – were “soldier-citizen[s] reflect[ing…] the transitional nature 
of the post-communist state” after the demise of the old regime and 
before the stabilisation of the new one.41 While this may at first glance 
sound similar to the German concept of the “citizen in uniform”, the 
setting in Poland was quite opposed since the Polish generals’ attitude 
towards the Third Republic’s civilian leaders clearly lacked identification 
with these: not only did the generals do everything to evade civilian over-
sight but they even sought to influence the government’s military poli-
cies, which they justified with their self-attained role as the actual guard-
ians of the country. However, some civilian politicians did not behave in 
so constructive a manner, either; indeed, one can argue that the lack of 
experience with democratic government and subsequent uncertainty of 
civilian politicians was a major trigger for military disobedience.42 To be 
sure, the Polish Army at no moment willingly endangered the general 
transition process towards democratic rule and a market economy; but 
the military leaders’ behaviour made clear in an exemplary manner the 
significant difference between mere “national” and actually democratic 
political culture.
At this point, Samuel Huntington’s theory of civil–military relations 
(CMR) as explained in his famous book “The Soldier and the State” 
deserves to be checked against the empirical case of Poland both before 
and under martial law.43 His “subjective” model of CMR assumes a close 
entanglement of the civil and the military sphere embodied by an officer 
corps consisting of “citizen-soldiers” with an essentially civilian view to 
matters of security policy and limited military professionalism. Likely, the 
country that comes closest to this “ideal” is Germany in the way described 
above, but certainly not Poland (at any moment pre- or post-1989). But 
neither allows the Polish military elite’s life-rescuing support in 1980–81 
for the ruling party – to whose leadership they belonged themselves – to 
41 Michta, Soldier-Citizen, 10.
42 Latawski, “Democratic Control,” 28.
43 A recent re-assessment is given by Dayne E. Nix, “American Civil–Military Relations. Sam-
uel P. Huntington and the Political Dimensions of Military Professionalism,” Naval War College 
Review vol 65, no 2, Spring (2012): 88–104.
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speak of separate spheres of activity with the civilian and military elites, 
with the latter one restricting itself to mere advisors as suggested by Hun-
tington’s “objective” CMR pattern. Altogether, his approach is little suit-
able for analysing non-democratic regimes, on whatever ideological basis 
those may rest.
Indeed, Andrew Michta was right in identifying the Polish generals 
of 1989–90 as “soldier-citizens” rather than “citizen-soldiers”; to them, a 
“soldierly” set of values was clearly available from Polish military tradi-
tion but hardly a civil-democratic one.
Infamous markers of that Polish state of uncertainty became inci-
dents that disclosed a deep mutual distrust between the military elite and 
the civilian government, rendered the necessary internal reforms more 
difficult and created confusion as to the actual distribution of power. One 
of these incidents was the so-called Parys Affair. Taking over as Defence 
Minister in December 1991, the arch-conservative and nationalistic Jan 
Parys set out to a veritable purge of the officers’ corps, driven by strong 
anti-communism and a related fear of continued Soviet/Russian influ-
ences. This led to numerous dismissals of officers considered to be “red”, 
among others the former members of the Military Council for National 
Salvation (Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego – WRON) that had 
been the main governing body during martial law (1981–83). Apart from 
alienating this way the military elite, the minister also clashed with State 
President Lech Wałęsa over the prerogatives in security affairs that were 
not defined clearly under the existing constitutional law; and the “Small 
Constitution” adopted in 1992 did not make things much clearer. Finally, 
failing to gain support by Parliament due to his confrontational attitude, 
Parys had to step down in May 1992.44
The takeover by a left-wing government in October 1993, dominated 
by the post-communist Alliance of the Democratic Left (Sojusz Lewicy 
Demokratycznej – SLD) did little to alleviate civil–military tensions. 
Indeed, the political and normative confusion of the officers became clear 
from the fact that on one hand these expressed a continued preference for 
44 Latawski, “Democratic Control,” 28–29.
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leftist views and parties,45 but at the same time the presence of left-wing 
politicians in the Ministry of Defence after 1993 made parts of the mili-
tary establishment suspect that the Ministry “had become an outpost of 
the SLD”.46
The second significant crisis concerning democratic civilian con-
trol of the Army evolved on the occasion of a dinner reception at the 
military training centre at Drawsko in Pomerania47 in September 1994 
where, in the presence of State President Wałęsa, the then Chief of 
Staff, General Tadeusz Wilecki, expressed his distrust of the Minister 
of Defence, Piotr Kołodziejczyk, which apparently accelerated the lat-
ter’s resignation. He was even suspected by some to aim himself at the 
office of Prime Minister, which was an idea wholly incompatible even 
with the moderate scheme of a “partner army”. This time, however, Par-
liament sided with the Defence Minister. Both were at the time sidelined 
by State President Wałęsa who aimed at subordinating the Army to him-
self by maintaining good personal relations with the General Staff and 
favouring it over the Defence Minister. But this policy ended when in 
1995 Wałęsa lost the presidential elections to the socialist candidate Alek-
sandr Kwaśniewski. The new President who was eager to even Poland’s 
path into the Western organisations, cooperated with the government 
and Parliament towards a more cooperative and effective civilian control 
scheme.48
The first main result of this was the adoption in 1996 of a new Law on 
the Minister of National Defence that integrated the General Staff clearly 
inside the Ministry of National Defence, and subordinated its chief to the 
Minister, i.e. to civilian control. In article 137 of the “Large Constitution” 
of 1997 then, the General Staff was finally subordinated to the President 
– who acts through the Minister of Defence – and to parliamentary con-
trol; as Supreme Commander the President appoints the Chief of Staff 
45 Michta, Soldier-Citizen, 17–21.
46 Ibid., 91.
47 The military history of this place goes back to Prussian and German times, then still by the 
name of Dramburg.
48 Michta, Soldier-Citizen, 91–92; Latawski, “Democratic Control,” 29–30.
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and the Heads of the different arms of the armed forces. Moreover, it 
created a National Security Council (Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego – 
RBN) as advisory body to the President and successor to the socialist era’s 
Committee for National Defence (Komitet Obrony Kraju – KOK). Here, 
Poland was obviously following the US model. Since even 1991 it has 
acted as a National Security Office (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego – 
BBN)  connected to the Chancellery of the President.49
NAtO integration as factor of change in the Polish military
The external dimension of military reform comprising relations with the 
USA and NATO as well as strategic and doctrinal considerations proved 
to be less burdened by such fundamental contradictions. As one thing, 
here the military experts were on their actual turf (differently from poli-
tics), which fact was generally acknowledged by the civilians; moreover, 
there was general agreement between civilian and military leaders as to 
the changed security environment after 1990 and the desirable goal of 
integration with the Western organisations, in particular NATO.
The General Staff has therefore had an important share in the plan-
ning and implementation of subsequent strategic documents aimed at 
preparing the Army for its Western integration. The first document, the 
National Security Strategy of 1992, anticipated that development but was 
naturally much influenced by the “limbo” situation after the dissolution 
of the Warsaw Pact in 1991. Poland’s accession to NATO in 1999 was fol-
lowed already in January 2000 by an updated National Security Strategy 
that set out equally Polish engagements out-of-area under the Atlantic 
Alliance and territorial defence, or security, tasks at home. However, any 
employment of the Army in the domestic context, apart from disaster 
relief, is highly unlikely in the light of history.50 In this respect, Poland has 
joined a European standard pattern.
49 Latawski, “Democratic Control,” 32–35.
50 Michta, Soldier-Citizen, 48–49; Latawski, “Polish Armed Forces and Society,” 29–31.
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Tellingly, it was to a large degree Poland’s negotiations about joining 
NATO that finally gave the Polish politicians the necessary momentum 
to force the military into subordination. One very visible signal was the 
demise in March 1997, on the eve of NATO’s decision on Poland’s acces-
sion, of “troublemaker” General Wilecki as Chief of the General Staff.51 
Since NATO insisted on the implementation of evident democratic con-
trol and the Polish military most of all wanted to be accepted by their 
Western peers, they finally accepted what can be labelled the Western lib-
eral model of civil–military relations. From February to April 1999 lasted 
the process of adopting new statutes for both the Ministry of Defence and 
the General Staff that streamlined and simplified the internal structures 
of these bodies, bringing them to NATO standards.
This means that it was to a large degree respect for NATO and espe-
cially its lead nation, the US (rather than for their own politicians), which 
made the Polish generals give in. Moreover, those civilian politicians, 
too, who were just as interested in being accepted by their Western coun-
terparts, still had to learn how to apply such an effective control of the 
Army. One factor that greatly helped this adaptation process was the Pol-
ish participation in numerous multinational structures, beginning from 
the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) in 1994, and activities that 
have also served to provide a certain cohesion among the post-socialist 
countries “heading west”.52
If theories are employed here such as institutional socialisation53 or 
epistemic communities54 both essentially suggesting a converging influ-
ence of national personnel’s activity within an international organisa-
tion or another (long-term) cross-border professional framework, then 
51 Michta, Soldier-Citizen, 104.
52 Ibid., 50; Latawski, “Democratic control,” 38.
53 Alastair Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly 45 (2001), 487–515; David H. Bearce, Stacy Bondanella, “Intergovern-
mental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence,“ International 
Organization 61, no 4, Fall (2007): 703–733.
54 Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordina-
tion,” International Organization 46, no 1, Winter: Knowledge, Power, and International Policy 
Coordination (1992): 1–35.
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such effects can be expected rather for those younger officers that have 
served within NATO structures or at least in connection with the Polish 
Army’s adaptation to NATO. The Social Research Division of the Pol-
ish Ministry of National Defence’s Military Centre for Civic Education 
(Wojskowe Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej) has, since 1991, run regular 
(half-yearly) opinion polls among professional officers55 regarding their 
assessment of, among other things, the anticipated and/or experienced 
effects of Poland’s NATO membership. As a general trend, the inter-
viewed officers, while acknowledging that the exchange of experiences 
with soldiers of other armies during common exercises etc. had signifi-
cantly enhanced their professional skills as well as technical moderni-
sation, also blamed the adaptation process for personnel reductions, a 
loss of social prestige and instances of internal “disorganisation”.56 In any 
case, the issues addressed in those polls were mostly interest-related and 
hardly of a normative nature. True, the younger officers’ generation very 
likely has been growing since the 1990s into some sort of transnational 
military culture, but this process was not accompanied by any (at least 
official) critical assessment of the Army’s pre-1990 policies.
However, what had worked with the pre-democratic military lead-
ership of 1989–90 regarding their giving in to NATO pressure with a 
view to effective civilian control, was mainly, as indicated, the prestige-
guided wish to gain official recognition by their Western, notably Ameri-
can, peers. That the Generals’ generation on the whole did not undergo 
any significant learning process in terms of a reformed attitude towards 
civil–military relations, which fact was no little furthered by the afore-
mentioned lack of essential normative (in contrast with procedural) 
changes on part of the new Solidarity-affiliated leadership of the Ministry 
of National Defence after summer 1990.
55 The Centre runs similar opinion polls among conscripted soldiers (until 2011, there was 
compulsory military service in Poland), but here I focus on those soldiers who have tied their 
career to the Army and need to identify with it in a substantial manner.
56 Katarzyna Anna Gronek, “Konsekwencje wynikające z przystąpienia Polski do NATO w 
ocenie środowiska wojskowego,” Bezpieczeństwo – obronność – socjologia. Biuletyn nr 1, April 
(2014): 3–21.
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Taking the view once more to the external dimension, obviously, and 
similarly as with the later enlargement of the European Union in 2004, 
Poland (and other countries concerned) was admitted into NATO in 
1999 before it had reached full technical and normative compatibility57 
because the receiving community itself expected to gain something from 
this: in the case of the EU this was the enlargement of the Common Mar-
ket, in the case of NATO the wish to remove the grey security zone that 
the demised Warsaw Pact had left behind and to calm down the region, 
and even more urgent, the need for a unified deployment area for the war 
against Yugoslavia in summer 1999. In this situation, quite a number of 
unresolved issues were tacitly superseded, or rather, postponed.
While today Poland has doubtless grown into NATO’s structures and 
already gained its own (ambiguous) experiences of the practical working 
within that alliance, the indicated domestic uncertainties as to the pur-
pose and practical capacity of its civilian and military security structures 
have not disappeared. This was highlighted, e.g. by the tragedy of the 10th 
of April 2010 when the presidential plane crashed near Smolensk which 
killed not only the President, his wife and several deputy government 
ministers but as well the Chief of Staff and the Commanders of the Army, 
Navy and Air Force. As one thing, the subsequent investigations hinted at 
a serious long-term neglect of security rules such as by far too few flight-
training hours on the account of the presidential pilots, in a country that 
spends vast sums on representational (cavalry) troops and the celebration 
of military holidays. Just for the sake of completeness the fact shall be 
mentioned here that after the incident of the 10th of April 2010 a funda-
mental rift (re)opened between, roughly speaking, the (national-)liberal 
and the (national-)conservative forces in Polish society (and media), with 
the latter group effectively blaming President Bronisław Komorowski 
and Prime Minister Donald Tusk with murder of then President Lech 
Kaczyński in the framework of a pro-Russian conspiracy. This “Polish-
Polish” cultural war has helped to undermine, at least to some degree, 
57 For an overview of the technical integration of the Polish Army in NATO structures see: 
Mieczysław Cieniuch, “The Polish Armed Forces’ Role and Development,” Military Technology 
35, no 8 (2011): 20–23.
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popular certainty about the achievement after 1990 of a minimal demo-
cratic consensus among the political parties. Differently from the Catho-
lic Church, the Polish Army has widely steered clear of that controversy, 
being widely occupied with its own internal restoration and adaptation to 
the new global security environ ment.
An issue that remains, however, is the attitude of the Polish Army 
towards the normative basis of democracy and its impact on national 
education: Without doubt, the Army is loyal to the Third Republic (as it 
had been to the People’s Republic); but so far, there is little evidence for 
any fundamental withdrawal of either military or civilian educators (at 
schools, museums, etc.) from the established, widely non-civilian narra-
tive of national strength, heroism, sacrifice and military victory as keys to 
political success.58 In the first place, it will be economic and civilisational 
progress made by Poland within the European Union – and the dwin-
dling attractiveness with young people of the military profession – that 
may set here a counterpoint in favour of a more civilian notion of politics.
Concluding remarks
Summing up, one can identify two major phases regarding the evolution 
of Polish thinking about security and defence, and the related practice: 
First, more or less throughout the 20th century until the early 1990s, a 
national-militarist discourse based on a “realist”, i.e. antagonistic and 
essentialist, perception of international relations that was essentially 
home-made but reinforced by the Second World War and subsequent 
Sovietisation. And second, from the early 1990s onward, a gradual learn-
ing process on part of the Army that led to an – at least superficial – 
“civilisation” of civil–military relations and foreign policy; there, external 
influences notably from the US were crucial for overcoming the Polish 
military leadership’s stubborn self-centredness and lack of responsibility. 
58 For some information on this topic see my article “Militär- und Kriegsmuseen in Deutsch-
land und Polen. Eine Betrachtung erinnerungspolitischer Tendenzen,” Inter Finitimos. Jahr-
buch zur deutsch-polnischen Beziehungsgeschichte vol 10 (2012): 36–53.
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The fact that after 1990 this military establishment was exchanged only in 
part and mostly due to technical and economic, but not political, reasons 
was due, on one hand, to pragmatic considerations, but arguably no less 
to the mythical, i.e. non-critical, image of the Army as an untouchable 
“national institution”.
Concerning the issue of how to characterise theoretically the posi-
tions and policies taken by the Polish Army before, during and after the 
“break” of 1989–90, this article has argued that none of the referred-to 
major Western theories are able to explain in a satisfying way the crucial 
motives and behavioural patterns at work there. Without excluding that 
other post-communist armies may show similar features, Polish civil–
military relations appear rather peculiar in terms of the far-reaching con-
tinuities in their ideological underpinnings across both the 1944–45 and 
the 1989–90 systemic change thresholds.
The fact that during the 1990s the Polish Army could relatively 
smoothly become integrated into NATO was obviously owed in the first 
place to its organisational, technological and armament-related adapta-
tion to Alliance standards. This included, as mentioned, common train-
ing and qualification measures and the establishment of effective demo-
cratic control; the latter, however, was at the time a necessary and thus 
pragmatic step that said little about the Polish military leadership’s actual 
normative views. At the same time, this process may be taken as a hint at 
NATO’s incumbent members’ attitude towards the post-communist can-
didates: Being sufficiently pragmatic to consider those elites’ views mainly 
with regard to their significance for Alliance cohesion and effectiveness, 
and presented with the former Soviet allies’ passionate desire to become 
“Western”, they did not investigate too much time in assessing the actual 
motives behind this attitude. This way, they followed an established pat-
tern that had worked in other countries before, e.g. in Germany, Italy, 
Spain or Portugal. Arguably, this is a point where the post-communist 
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